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Abstract
The first known cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), associated with infection by a novel coronavirus (CoV),
occurred in 2012 in Jordan but were reported retrospectively. The case first to be publicly reported was from Jeddah, in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Since then, MERS-CoV sequences have been found in a bat and in many dromedary
camels (DC). MERS-CoV is enzootic in DC across the Arabian Peninsula and in parts of Africa, causing mild upper
respiratory tract illness in its camel reservoir and sporadic, but relatively rare human infections. Precisely how virus transmits
to humans remains unknown but close and lengthy exposure appears to be a requirement. The KSA is the focal point of
MERS, with the majority of human cases. In humans, MERS is mostly known as a lower respiratory tract (LRT) disease
involving fever, cough, breathing difficulties and pneumonia that may progress to acute respiratory distress syndrome,
multiorgan failure and death in 20 % to 40 % of those infected. However, MERS-CoV has also been detected in mild and
influenza-like illnesses and in those with no signs or symptoms. Older males most obviously suffer severe disease and
MERS patients often have comorbidities. Compared to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), another sometimes- fatal
zoonotic coronavirus disease that has since disappeared, MERS progresses more rapidly to respiratory failure and acute
kidney injury (it also has an affinity for growth in kidney cells under laboratory conditions), is more frequently reported in
patients with underlying disease and is more often fatal. Most human cases of MERS have been linked to lapses in
infection prevention and control (IPC) in healthcare settings, with approximately 20 % of all virus detections reported
among healthcare workers (HCWs) and higher exposures in those with occupations that bring them into close contact
with camels. Sero-surveys have found widespread evidence of past infection in adult camels and limited past exposure
among humans. Sensitive, validated reverse transcriptase real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-rtPCR)-based diagnostics
have been available almost from the start of the emergence of MERS. While the basic virology of MERS-CoV has advanced
over the past three years, understanding of the interplay between camel, environment, and human remains limited.
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Background
An email from Dr Ali Mohamed Zaki, an Egyptian
virologist working at the Dr Soliman Fakeeh Hospital in
Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) an-
nounced the first culture of a new coronavirus to the
world. The email was published on the website of the
professional emerging diseases (ProMED) network on
20thSeptember 2012 [1] (Fig. 1) and described the first
reported case, a 60 year old man from Bisha in the KSA.
This information led to the rapid discovery of a second
case of the virus, this time in an ill patient in the United
Kingdom, who had been transferred from Qatar for care
[2]. The new virus was initially called novel coronavirus
(nCoV) and subsequentlty entitled the Middle East
respiratoy syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). As of
2nd of September 2015, there have been 1,493 detections
of viral RNA or virus-specific antibodies across 26
countries (Additional file 1: Figure S1) confirmed by the
World Health Organization (WHO), with over a third
of the positive people dying (at least 527, 35 %) [3].
Since that first report, a slow discovery process over
the following two to three years revealed a virus that had
infected over 90 % of adult dromedary camels (DC; Came-
lus dromedarius) in the KSA [4], also DCs across the Ara-
bian Peninsula and parts of Africa that are a source of DC
imports for the KSA [5]. To date, MERS-CoV has not
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been detected in DCs tested in zoos or herds from other
parts of the world [6–9]. Occasionally, virus is transmitted
from infected DCs to exposed humans. Subsequent trans-
mission to other humans requires relatively close and pro-
longed exposure [10].
The first viral isolate was patented and concerns were
raised that this would restrict access to both the virus
and to viral diagnostics [11, 12]. However, sensitive, vali-
dated reverse transcriptase real-time polymerase chain
reaction (RT-rtPCR)-based diagnostics were quickly de-
scribed and virus was made freely available subject to
routine biosafety considerations [13]. Subsequent epi-
demiology and research has identified the cell receptor
as exopeptidase dipeptidyl peptidase 4 (DPP4; also called
CD26); that MERS-CoV has a broad tropism, replicating
better in some cells lines and eliciting a more proinflam-
matory response than SARS-CoV; is widespread in DCs;
has the potential to infect other animals and that MERS
kills its human host more often than SARS did (20-40 %
versus 9 % for SARS [14]) [15–19].
In humans, overt disease was given the name Middle
East respiratory syndrome, with the acronym MERS. From
intermittent animal-to-human spill-over events, the
MERS-CoV spreads sporadically among people, causing
more severe disease among older adults, especially males,
with pre-existing diseases. The spread of MERS-CoV
among humans has often been associated with outbreaks
in hospitals, with around 20 % of all cases to date involv-
ing healthcare workers (HCWs).
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
Although DCs appear to suffer the equivalent of a
‘common cold’ from MERS-CoV infection, in humans,
the virus can be a more serious and opportunistic patho-
gen associated with the death of up to 40 % of reported
cases. It has yet to be established whether infections
thought to have been acquired from an animal source
produce a more severe outcome than those spread
between humans [20]. Studies have established that the
mean incubation period for MERS is five to six days,
ranging from two to 16 days, with 13 to 14 days between
when illness begins in one person and subsequently
spreads to another [21–24]. Among those with progres-
sive illness, the median time to death is 11 to 13 days,
ranging from five to 27 days [23, 24]. Fever and gastro-
intestinal symptoms may form a prodrome, after which
symptoms decline, only to be followed by a more severe
systemic and respiratory syndrome [25, 26].
The definition of a case
The first WHO case definition [27] defined probable
cases of MERS based on the presence of febrile illness,
cough and requirement for hospitalization with suspi-
cion of lower respiratory tract (LRT) involvement. It also
included roles for contact with a probable or confirmed
case or for travel or residence within the Arabian Penin-
sula. If strictly adhered to, only the severe syndrome
would be subject to laboratory testing, which was the
paradigm early on [21]. From July 2013, the revised
WHO case definition included the importance of seek-
ing out and understanding the role of asymptomatic
cases and from June 2014, the WHO definition more
clearly stated that a confirmed case included any person
whose sample was RT-PCR positive for MERS-CoV, or
who produced a seroconversion, irrespective of clinical
signs and symptoms. [28–30] Apart from the WHO and
the KSA Ministry of Health reports, asymptomatic or
subclinical cases of MERS-CoV infection were docu-
mented in the scientific literature although not always as
often as occurred early on [31, 32]. The KSA definition
of a case became more strict on 13th May 2014, relying
on the presence of both clinical features and laboratory
confirmation [33]. Testing of asymptomatic people was
recommended against from December 2014 [34], rein-
forced by a case definition released by the KSA Ministry
of Health in June 2015 [35].
Fig. 1 A timeline of some key scientific milestones, mass gatherings of relevance and clusters and outbreaks of interest to the understanding of MERS-CoV
infection among humans and transmission from animals to humans. A yellow circle indicates when a country reported a laboratory confirmed detection
and an orange circle denotes ensuing local transmission. A sample of the mentions of DC contact prior to disease is indicated by a black
camel icon. DPP4-dipeptidyl peptidase 4; KSA-the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Mab-monoclonal antibody; rAdV-recombinant adenovirus;
rMVA-recombinant modified vaccinia virus Ankara; UAE-United Arab Emirates
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The KSA has been the source of 79 % of human cases.
Severe MERS is notable for its impact among older men
with comorbid diseases including diabetes mellitus, cir-
rhosis and various lung, renal and cardiac conditions
[36–38]. Interestingly in June 2015, an outbreak in South
Korea followed a similar distribution [39, 40]. Among
laboratory confirmed cases, fever, cough and upper
respiratory tract (URT) signs and symptoms usually
occur first, followed within a week by progressive LRT
distress and lymphopaenia [37]. Patients often present to
a hospital with pneumonia, or worse, and secondary bac-
terial infections have been reported [37, 41]. Disease can
progress to acute respiratory distress syndrome and mul-
tiorgan system failure [37]. MERS has reportedly killed
approximately 35 % of all reported cases, 42 % of cases
in the KSA, yet only 19 % of cases in South Korea,
where mortality ranged from 7 % among younger age
groups to 40 % among those aged 60 years and above [42];
all may be inflated values with asymptomatic or mild in-
fections sometimes not sought or not reported [34]. Gen-
eral supportive care is key to managing severe cases [43].
Children under the age of 14 years are rarely reported to
be positive for MERS-CoV, comprising only 1.1 % (n = 16)
of total reported cases. Between 1st September 2012 and
2nd December 2013, a study described the then tally of
paediatric cases in the KSA, which stood at 11 (two to
16 years of age; median 13 years); nine were asymptomatic
(72 %) and one infant died [44]. In Amman, Jordan, 1,005
samples from hospitalized children under the age of two
years with fever and/or respiratory signs and symptoms
were tested but none were positive for MERS-CoV RNA,
despite being collected at a similar time to the first known
outbreak of MERS-CoV in the neighbouring town of
Al-Zarqa [45]. A second trimester stillbirth occurred
in a pregnant woman during an acute respiratory illness
and while not RT-rtPCR positive, the mother did subse-
quently develop antibodies to MERS-CoV, suggestive of
recent infection [46]. Her exposure history to a MERS-
CoV RT-rtPCR positive relative and an antibody-reactive
husband, her incubation period and her symptom history
met the WHO criteria for being a probable MERS-CoV
case [46].
Laboratory testing to confirm past or present
MERS-CoV infection
Diagnostic methods were published within days of the
ProMED email announcing the first MERS case [47],
including several now gold standard in-house RT-rtPCR
assays (Fig. 2) as well as virus culture in Vero and LLC-
MK2 cells [18, 47, 48]. A colorectal adenocarcinoma
(Caco-2) epithelial cell line has since been recommended
for isolation of infections MERS-CoV [49]. We previously
Fig. 2 Schematic of MERS-CoV genome drawn to scale (EMC/2012; JX869059 [18].). Open reading frames are indicated as yellow rectangles bracketed
by terminal untranslated regions (UTR; grey rectangles). FS-frame-shift. Predicted regions encompassing recombination break-points are indicated by
orange pills. Created using Geneious v8.1 [211] and annotated using Adobe Illustrator. Beneath this is a schematic depicting the location of RT-PCR
primers (blue arrows indicate direction) and oligoprobes (green rectangles) used in the earliest RT-rtPCR screening assays and conventional, semi-nested
(three primers) RT-PCR confirmatory sequencing assays [47, 48]. Publication order is noted by first [27th September 2012; red] and second
[6th December 2012; orange] coloured rectangles; both from Corman et al. [47, 48] Those assays recommended by the WHO are highlighted underneath
by yellow dots [53]. The NSeq reverse primer has consistently contained one sequence mismatch with some MERS-CoV variants. An altered version of
that from Mackay IM, Arden KE. Middle East respiratory syndrome: An emerging coronavirus infection tracked by the crowd. Virus Res 2015 Vol 202:60–88
with permission from Elsevier [5]
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reviewed the broad tropism of MERS-CoV [5]. However,
as is well described, cell culture is a slow, specialised and
insensitive method [50] while PCR-based techniques are
the preferred method for MERS-CoV detection.
Molecular detection of MERS-CoV RNA in real time
The first open reading frames (ORF 1a and 1b; Fig. 2)
have become a key diagnostic and taxonomic target for
CoV species identification. With less than 80 % identity
between the amino acid sequence of MERS ORF 1ab
and betacoronavirus relatives, Tylonycteris bat HKU4
and Pipistrellus bat HKU5, it can be concluded that it is
a novel and distinct virus. MERS-CoV is predicted to en-
code ten open reading frames with 5’ and 3’ untranslated
regions [51]. The structural proteins include the spike
(S), envelope (E), membrane (M) and nucleocapsid (N)
[52]. The products of ORF1a and ORF1b are predicted
to encode nonstructural proteins.
The majority of specimen testing to date has employed
validated RT-rtPCR assays shown to be sensitive and
specific [47, 48, 53]. The RealStar® kit uses these WHO-
recommended assays [54]. The target sequences of these
screening assays have not changed among genomes ex-
amined until at least mid-2015 (IMM observation).
Other RT-rtPCR assays have been developed and vali-
dated for use as laboratory-based diagnostic tools [55–
57]. Additionally, loop-mediated [58, 59] or recombin-
ase polymerase [60] isothermal assays have been de-
signed for field deployment.
MERS-CoV antigen detection
The detection of MERS-CoV antigen has not been com-
mon to date but the combination of short turnaround
time from test to result, high throughput and identifica-
tion of viral proteins makes this an attractive option. De-
tection of viral proteins rather than viral RNA indicates
the likely presence of infectious virus. The first rapid
immunochromatographic tool described could detect re-
combinant MERS-CoV nucleocapsid protein from DC
nasal swabs with 94 % sensitivity and 100 % specificity
compared to RT-rtPCR [61]. A different approach used a
monoclonal antibody-based capture ELISA targeting the
MERS-CoV nucleocapsid protein with a sensitivity of
103 TCID50 and 100 % specificity [62].
Assays to identify a humoral response to prior MERS-CoV
infection among humans
Demonstration of a seroconversion to a MERS-CoV infec-
tion meets the current WHO definition of a case so opti-
mized and thoroughly validated sero-assays employed
alongside good clinical histories are useful to both identify
prior MERS-CoV infection and help support transmission
studies. Because serology testing is, by its nature, retro-
spective, it is usual to detect a viral footprint, in the form
of antibodies, in the absence of any signs or symptoms of
disease and often in the absence of any viral RNA [63].
Strategic, widespread sero-surveys of humans using
samples collected after 2012 are infrequent. Much of the
Arabian Peninsula and all of the Horn of Africa lack
baseline data describing the proportion of the commu-
nity who may have been infected by a MERS-CoV.
However, sero-surveys have had widespread use in eluci-
dating the role of DCs as a transmission source for
MERS-CoV. Because of the identity shared between DC
and human MERS-CoV (see Molecular epidemiology:
using genomes to understand outbreaks), serological
assays for DC sero-surveys should be transferrable to
human screening with minimal re-configuration. Also,
no diagnostically relevant variation in neutralization
activity have been found from among a range of circulat-
ing tested MERS-CoV isolates and sera, so whole virus
or specific protein-based sero-assays should perform
equivalently in detecting serological responses to the sin-
gle MERS-CoV serotype [49]. The development of ro-
bust serological assays requires reliable panels of well-
characterized animal or human sera, including those posi-
tive for antibodies specific to MERS-CoV, as well as to
likely sources of cross-reaction [64]. Obtaining these
materials was problematic and slowed the development
and commercialization of antibody detection assays for
human testing [64]. A number of commercial ELISA kits,
immunofluorescent assays (IFA) kits, recombinant pro-
teins and monoclonal antibodies have been released [31,
65–68]. Initially, conventional IFAs were used for human
sero-surveys. These relied on MERS-CoV-infected cell
culture as an antigen source, detecting the presence of hu-
man anti-MERS-CoV IgG, IgM or neutralizing antibodies
in human samples [18, 48, 69]. No sign of MERS-CoV
antibodies was found among 2,400 sera from patients vis-
iting Hospital in Jeddah, from 2010 through 2012, prior to
the description of MERS-CoV [18]. Nor did IFA methods
detect any sign of prior MERS-CoV infection among a
small sample of 130 healthy blood donors from another
Hospital in Jeddah (collected between Jan and Dec 2012)
[70]. Of 226 slaughterhouse workers, only eight (3.5 %)
were positive by IFA, and those sera could not be con-
firmed by virus neutralization (NT) test. The study indi-
cated that HCoV-HKU1 was a likely source of cross-
reactive antigen in the whole virus IFA [70]. Whole virus
MERS-CoV IFA also suffered from some cross-reactivity
with convalescent SARS patient sera and this could not be
resolved by an NT test which was also cross-reactive [71].
IFA using recombinant proteins instead of whole-virus
IFA, has been shown to be a more specific tool [31]. Since
asymptomatic zoonoses have been posited [72], an ab-
sence of antibodies to MERS-CoV among some humans
who have regular and close contact with camels may re-
flect the rarity of actively infected animals at butcheries, a
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limited transmission risk associated with slaughtering DCs
[70], a pre-existing cross-protective immune status or
some other factor(s) resulting in a low risk of disease and
concurrent seroconversion developing after exposure in
this group. IFA using recombinant proteins instead.
Some sero-assays have bypassed the risks of working
with infectious virus by creating transfected cells express-
ing recombinant portions of the MERS-CoV nucleocapsid
and spike proteins [48, 73], or using a recombinant lenti-
virus expressing MERS-CoV spike protein and luciferase
[74, 75]. A pseudo particle neutralization (ppNT) assay
has seen widespread used in animal studies and was at
least as sensitive as the traditional microneutralization
(MNT) test. [10, 74, 76–78] Studies using small sample
numbers and ppNT found no evidence of MERS-CoV
neutralizing antibody in sera from 158 children with LRT
infections between May 2010 and May 2011, 110 sera
from 19 to 52 year old male blood donors and 300 self-
identified animal workers from the Jazan Region of the
KSA during 2012 [79, 80]. Similarly, a study of four herds-
men in contact with an infected DC herd in Al-Ahsa,
eight people who had intermittent contact with the herd,
30 veterinary surgeons and support staff who were not ex-
posed to the herd, three unprotected abattoir workers in
Al-Ahsa and 146 controls who were not exposed to DCs
in any professional role, found none with serological evi-
dence of past MERS-CoV infection using the ppNT assay
[10]. A delay in the neutralizing antibody response to
MERS-CoV infection was associated with increased dis-
ease severity in South Korea cases with most responses
detectable by week three of illness while others, even
though disease was severe, did not respond for four or
more weeks [81]. The implications for our ability to detect
any response in mild or asymptomatic cases was not ex-
plored but may be a signifcant factor in understanding ex-
posure in the wider community.
A Jordanian outbreak of acute LRT disease in a
hospital in 2012 was retrospectively found to be associ-
ated with MERS-CoV infection, initially using RT-
rtPCR, but subsequently, and on a larger scale, through
positivity by ELISA and IFA or MNT test. [46, 82, 83]
This outbreak predated the first case of MERS in the
KSA. The ELISA used a recombinant nucleocapsid pro-
tein from the group 2 betacoronavirus bat-CoV HKU5
to identify antibodies against the equivalent cross-
reactive MERS-CoV protein [71]. It was validated using
545 sera collected from people with prior HCoV-OC43,
HCoV-229E, SARS-CoV, HCoV-NL63, HRV, HMPV or
influenza A(H1N1) infections but was reportedly less
specific than the recombinant IFA discussed above. It
was still considered an applicable tool for screening large
sample numbers [82]. A protein microarray expressing
the S1 protein subunit has also been validated and
widely used for DC testing [5, 84]. Detection of MERS-
CoV infection using ELISA or S1 subunit protein micro-
array [84] is usually followed by confirmatory IFA and/
or a plaque-reduction neutralization (PRNT) [69, 70, 85]
or MNT test. [74, 85, 86] This confirmatory process
aims toensure the antibodies detected are able to specif-
ically neutralize the intended virus and are not more
broadly reactive to other coronaviruses found in DCs
(bovine CoV, BCoV) or humans (HCoV-OC43, HCoV-
229E, HCoV-NL63, HCoV-HKU1, SARS-CoV). In the lar-
gest study of human sera, a tiered diagnostic process
assigned both recombinant IFA and recombinant ELISA
positive sera to ‘stage 1’ seropositivity. A stage 2 seroposi-
tive result additionally required a suitably titred PRNT re-
sult [87]. The study found 15 sera collected in 2012 to
2013 from 10,009 (0.2 %) people in 13 KSA provinces con-
tained MERS-CoV antibodies, but significantly higher pro-
portions in occurred in camel shepherds (two of 87; 2.3 %)
and slaughterhouse workers (five of 140; 3.6 %) [87]. Con-
temporary surveys are needed.
MERS-CoV does not appear to be easily transmitted
from DCs to humans, or perhaps it is [72], but generally
does not trigger a detectable immune response if only
mild disease or asymptomatic infection results. Serology
assays are in need of further validation in this area so
care is required when moving newly developed diagnos-
tic serology algorithms from a research setting to one
that informs public health decisions. This was reinforced
when a false positive US case, purported to have been
infected after a handshake and two face-to-face meet-
ings, did not withstand further confirmatory analysis
using a more specific, NT assay and was subsequently
retracted [88, 89].
Specimen types for RT-PCR and length of viral shedding
The WHO recommends sampling from the LRT for
MERS-CoV RT-rtPCR testing, especially when sample
collection is delayed by a week or more after onset of
symptoms. [53] LRT samples are also best for attempting
isolation of infectious virus, although the success of
culture is reduced when disease persists [49]. Recom-
mended sample types include bronchoalveolar lavage
(BAL), tracheal/tracheobronchial aspirate, pleural fluid
and sputum [53, 90]. Fresh samples yield better diagnos-
tic results than refrigerated material [69] and if delays in
testing of ≥72 h are likely, samples (except for blood)
should be frozen at −70 °C [90]. If available, lung biopsy
or autopsy tissues can also be tested [53]. The URT is a
less invasive and more convenient sampling site how-
ever, and an oropharyngeal and throat swab or a naso-
pharyngeal aspirate/wash are recommended when URT
sampling is to be conducted [90]. Paired sera, collected
two to three weeks apart are preferable for serological
testing while a single sample is suggested to be sufficient
if collected two weeks after onset of disease or a single
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serum collected during the first 10–12 days if conduct-
ing RT-rtPCR [53, 90]. Human urine and stool have
been found to contain MERS-CoV RNA 12 to 26 days
after symptom onset [25, 69, 91] and are listed as sam-
ples that should be considered [53, 90]. In two cases that
arrived in the Netherlands, urine was RT-rtPCR negative
but faeces was weakly positive and sera were RT-rtPCR
positive for five days or more [25]. The finding of
MERS-CoV viral RNA in serum provides an avenue for
retrospective PCR-based studies if respiratory samples
are unavailable [83]. RNAaemia may also correlate with
disease severity; signs of virus were cleared from the
serum of a recovered patient, yet lingered until the death
of another [92].
Clinically suspected MERS cases may return negative
results by RT-rtPCR. Data have shown one or more
negative URT samples may be contradicted by further
URT sampling or the use of LRT samples, which is pre-
ferred [2, 43, 93]. Higher viral loads occur in the LRT
compared to the URT. [22, 69, 88, 94] This fits with the
observation that the majority of disease symptoms are
reported to manifest as systemic and LRT disease [21].
However, on occasion, even LRT specimens from MERS
cases may initially be negative, only to later become
positive by RT-PCR [95]. This may be due to poor sam-
pling when a cough is absent or non-productive or be-
cause the viral load is low [95]. Despite this both the
largest human MERS-CoV studies [32, 96–98] and
smaller ones [22, 25, 99], use samples from the URT. It
is then noteworthy that one study reported an associ-
ation between higher loads in the URT and worse clin-
ical outcome including intensive care and death [94]. At
writing, no human data exist to define whether the virus
replicates solely or preferentially in the LRT or URT, or
replicates in other human tissues in vivo although
MERS-CoV RNA has been detected from both the URT
and LRT in a macaque monkey model [100].The distri-
bution of DPP4 in the human upper airways is also not
well described.
Individual human case studies report long periods
of viral shedding, sometimes intermittently and not
necessarily linked to the presence of disease symp-
toms. [25, 69, 99, 101] In one instance, a HCW shed
viral RNA for 42 days in the absence of disease [99].
It is an area of high priority to better understand
whether such cases are able to infect others. Over
three quarters of MERS cases shed viral RNA in their
LRT specimens (tracheal aspirates and sputum) for at
least 30 days, while only 30 % of contacts were still
shedding RNA in their URT specimens [91, 102].
In the only study to examine the effect of sample type
on molecular analysis, 64 nasopharyngeal aspirates
(NPA; an URT sample), 30 tracheal aspirates, 13 sputa
and three BAL were examined. The tracheal aspirates
and BAL returned the highest viral load values followed
by NPA and sputum. Unsurprisingly, higher viral loads
generally paralleled whole genome sequencing and cul-
ture success and, in NPA testing, were significantly cor-
related with severe disease and death [49, 94, 103]. This
study demonstrated the importance of LRT sampling
for whole genome sequencing.
MERS-CoV and concurrent infections
When tested, samples positive for MERS-CoV are often
negative for other pathogens [2, 25, 93, 104]. However,
many studies make no mention of additional testing for
endemic human respiratory viruses [21, 23, 73, 105].
When viruses are sought, they have included human
herpesvirus (HHV), rhinoviruses (HRV), enteroviruses
(EV), respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), parainfluenzavirus
types 1, 2 and 3 (PIVs),influenzaviruses (IFVs), endemic
HCoVs, adenoviruses (AdVs) metapneumovirus (MPV)
and influenza A\H1N1 virus; co-detections with MERS-
CoV have been found on occasion [2, 22, 37, 69, 97].
Bacterial testing is sometimes included (for example, for
Legionella and Pneumococcus) but the impact of bacterial
co-presence is also unclear [22, 104–106]. Further testing
of the LRT sample from the first MERS case used IFA to
screen for some viruses (negative for IFV, PIVs, RSV and
AdVs) and RT-PCR for others (negative for AdV, EVs,
MPV and HHVs) [18]. RT-PCR also detected MERS-CoV.
The WHO strongly recommends testing for other respira-
tory pathogens [53] but with this recommendation often
discounted, there are limited data to address the
occurrence and impact of co-infections or alternative viral
diagnoses among both MERS cases and their contacts. Lit-
tle is known of other causes of MERS-like pneumonia in
the KSA or of the general burden of disease due to the
known classical respiratory viruses.
Mass MERS-CoV screening studies
Testing of adult pilgrims performing the Hajj in 2012 to
2014 has not detected any MERS-CoV. In 2012, nasal
swabs from 154 pilgrims collected prior to leaving for or
departing from the KSA were tested [47]. In 2013,
testing was significantly scaled up with 5,235 nasopha-
ryngeal swabs from 3,210 incoming pilgrims and 2,025
swabs from outgoing pilgrims tested [98]. It should be
noted that most pilgrims arrived from MERS-free coun-
tries. A further 114 swabs were taken from pilgrims with
influenza-like illness [96, 107]. In earlier Hajj gatherings,
it was found that influenza viruses circulated widely,
whilst other viruses, often rhinoviruses, circulated more
selectively, interpreted as indicating their importation
along with foreign pilgrims. [107–109] Over time, in-
creased influenza vaccination has been credited for a fall
in the prevalence of influenza like illnesses among Hajj
pilgrims. [110] A LRT sample is often not collected for
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Fig. 3 (See legend on next page.)
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these studies [98, 107, 109], so false negative findings
are a possibility although little is known about the
initial site of MERS-CoV infection and replication; it
may have been assumed it was the LRT because disease
was first noticed there but the URT may be the site of the
earliest replication.
In Jeddah between March and July 2014 (hereafter
called the Jeddah-2014 outbreak; Fig. 3), there was a
rapid increase in MERS cases, accompanied by intense
screening; approximately 5,000 samples from in and
around the region were tested in a month yielding around
140 MERS-CoV detections (~3 % prevalence) [111].
Among 5,065 individuals sampled and tested across the
KSA between October 2012 and September 2013,108
(2.1 %) detections were made in a hospital-centric popula-
tion which included hospitalized cases (n = 2,908; 57.4 %),
their families (n = 462; 9.1 %) and associated HCWs
(n = 1,695; 33.5 %) [32]. Among the detections, 19
(17.8 %) were HCWs and 10 (9.3 %) were family
contacts [32].
The 2-3 % prevalence of active MERS-CoV infections
is not dissimilar to the hospital-based prevalence of
other human CoVs. [112] However, the proportion of
deaths among those infected with MERS-CoV is much
higher than that known for the HCoVs NL63, HKU1,
229E or OC43 in other countries, and even above that
for SARS-CoV; it is not a virus that could reasonably be
described as a “storm in a teacup”. It is the low transmis-
sion rate that has prevented worldwide spread, despite
many “opportunities”.
Sporadic spill-over and facilitated outbreaks
Very early in the MERS outbreak, some animals were
highly regarded as either the reservoir or intermediate
host(s) of MERS-CoV with three of the first five cases
having contact with DCs [73, 113, 114]. Today, animal
MERS-CoV infections must be reported to the world
organization for animal health as an emerging disease
[115]. A summary of the first MERS cases reported by
the WHO defined animal contact with humans as being
direct and within 10 days prior to symptom onset [20].
This definition made no specific allowance for acquisi-
tion from DCs through a droplet-based route, which is
very likely route for acquisition of a virus that initially
and predominantly causes respiratory disease [23].
Camels are known to produce high levels of MERS-CoV
RNA in their URT and lungs [116]. Providing support
for a droplet transmission route and perhaps indicating
the presence of RNA in smaller, drier droplet nuclei,
MERS-CoV RNA was identified in a high volume air
sample collected from a barn housing an infected DC
[117]. The precise source from which humans acquire
MERS-CoV remains poorly studied but it seems likely
that animal and human behavioural factors may play
roles (Fig. 3) [118]. These factors may prove important
for human cases who do not describe any DC contact
[119] nor any contact with a confirmed case. Whether
the WHO definition of animal contact is sufficient to
identify exposure to this respiratory virus remains un-
clear. Wording focuses on consumption of DC products
but does not specifically ascribe risk to a droplet route
for acquisition of MERS-CoV from DC [120]. Some
MERS patients are listed in WHO disease notices as be-
ing in proximity to DCs or farms, but the individuals
have not described coming into contact with the ani-
mals. No alternative path for acquiring infection is re-
ported in many of these instances. What constitutes a
definition of “contact” during these interviews has been
defined for one study [72]. Despite this lack of clarity,
the WHO consider that evidence linking MERS-CoV
transmission between DCs to humans is irrefutable
(Fig. 4) [120].
The possibility that bats were an animal host of
MERS-CoV was initially widely discussed because of the
existing diversity of coronaviruses known to reside
among them [121–124]. Conclusive evidence supporting
bats as a source for human infections by MERS-CoV has
yet to be found, but bats do appear to host ancestral
representatives [53, 125]. However, these are not variants
of the same virus nor always within the same phylogen-
etic lineage as MERS-CoV; they are each a genetically
distinct virus. Bat-to-human infection by MERS-CoV is
a purely speculative event. The only piece of MERS-
CoV-specific evidence pointing to bats originates from
amplification of a 190 nt fragment of the RNA-
dependent RNA polymerase gene of the MERS-CoV
genome, identified in a faecal pellet from an insectivor-
ous Emballonuridae bat, Taphozous perforatus found in
Bisha, the KSA [121]. While very short, the sequence of
the fragment defined it as a diagnostic discovery. Subse-
quently a link to DCs was reported [85] and that link
has matured into a verified association [38, 126] (Fig. 4).
(See figure on previous page.)
Fig. 3 Monthly detections of MERS-CoV (blue bars) and of cases who died (red bars) with some dates of interest marked for 2012 to 4th September 2015.
An approximation of when DC calving season [128] and when recently born DCs are weaned is indicated. Spring (green) and summer (orange) in the
Arabian Peninsula are also shaded. Note the left-hand y-axis scale for 2014 and 2015 which is greater than for 2012/13. Sources of these public data include
the WHO, Ministries of Health and FluTrackers [207–209]. Earlier and subsequent versions of this chart are maintained on a personal blog [210]. Modified
and reprinted from Mackay IM, Arden KE. Middle East respiratory syndrome: An emerging coronavirus infection tracked by the crowd. Virus Res 2015 Vol
202:60–88 with permission from Elsevier [5]
Mackay and Arden Virology Journal  (2015) 12:222 Page 8 of 21
DCs, which make up 95 % of all camels, have a central
presence in the Arabian Peninsula where human-DC
contact ranges from little to close [119]. Contact may be
commonplace and could occur in variety of ways
(Fig. 4a). There are several large well-attended festivals,
races, sales and parades which feature DCs and DCs are
also kept and bred close to populated areas in the KSA
[127, 128]. DC milk and meat are widely consumed and
the older DC is an animal of ritual significance after the
Hajj pilgrimage [129]. However, MERS-CoV infection
frequency is reportedly much lower than is the widespread
and frequent habit of eating, drinking and preparing DC
products. Daily ingestion of fresh unpasteurized DC milk
is common among the desert Bedouin and many others in
the KSA. DC urine is also consumed or used for supposed
health benefits. Despite camel butchery being a local
occupation, neither butchers nor other at-risk groups are
identifiable among MERS cases; this may simply be a
reporting issue rather than an unexplainable absence of
MERS. A small case–control study published in 2015
identified direct DC contact, and not ingestion of prod-
ucts, to be associated with onset of MERS [38].
The first sero-survey of livestock living in the Middle
East region was conducted during 2012–2013 [85]. DCs
were sampled from a mostly Canary Island-born herd
and from Omani DCs (originally imported from the
Horn of Africa) [85]. A neutralising antibody assay




Fig. 4 A speculative series of how humans and DCs contribute to the global tally of MERS cases. a. Risks for acquiring MERS-CoV from a DC. This
illustration highlights risks that may originate from a droplet transmission component (be they larger, heavier wet droplets or the drier, airborne
gel-like droplet nuclei) or a direct contact component (within the green circle). No routes of MERS-CoV acquisition to or between humans have
been proven to date. Modified and reprinted from Mackay IM, Arden KE. Middle East respiratory syndrome: An emerging coronavirus infection
tracked by the crowd. Virus Res 2015 Vol 202:60–88 with permission from Elsevier [5]. b Camel-to-human infections appear to be infrequent, while
human-to-human spread of infection is regularly facilitated by poor IPC in healthcare settings where transmission is amplified, accounting
for the bulk of cases. There are human MERS cases that do not fall into either category of source and it is unclear if these acquired
infection through some entirely separate route, or from cases that escaped diagnosis. c Hypothetical ways in which subclinical (when
infection may not meet a previously defined clinical threshold of signs and/or symptoms) or asymptomatic (no obvious signs or
measured, noticed or recalled symptoms of illness) MERS-CoV infection may be implicated in transmission
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DC sera could neutralise MERS-CoV while all Omani
DC sera had high levels of specific MERS-CoV neutral-
izing antibody [85]. This indicated that DCs had in the
past been infected by MERS-CoV, or a very similar virus.
Since this study, a host of peer-reviewed reports have
looked at both DCs and other animals, and the possibil-
ity that they may host MERS-CoV infection. Seropositive
DCs have been found throughout the Arabian Peninsula
including Oman, the KSA, Qatar, Jordan, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait as well as Sudan, Somalia,
Egypt, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia in Africa
and the Canary Islands [85, 130–134]. Other animals
tested include sheep, cows, pigs, horses, donkeys, mules,
birds, water buffalo, goats, Bactrian camels, llamas and
guanaco (south American camelids) but none had
detectable neutralising antibody against MERS-CoV
[4, 74, 78, 85, 86, 135, 136]. No virology or serology
studies of human samples from areas in Africa where
there are camels with a history of MERS-CoV have
been reported to date. However,an absence of unex-
plained pneumonia that may be attributable to MERS-
CoV infection may not signal the absence of virus
among humans in each country but simply reflect a
lack of expensive epidemiology studies conducted by
resource-poor countries. It is thus unclear whether
MERS-CoV, or an antigenically related CoV, is an
unrecognized pathogen in these regions, perhaps
circulating for even longer than it has been known in
the Arabian Peninsula [133].
MERS-CoV RNA has also been detected in DC
samples, and recovery of infectious virus has also been
achieved from DC samples [4, 77, 117, 132, 137–141].
From some of these, full or majority length genomes of
MERS-CoV have been sequenced [77, 137, 138]. DC ver-
sions of MERS-CoV were found to be as similar to each
other, as were variants detected from different humans
over time and across distance.
Antibody screening assays have also detected cross-
reactive antibodies in sera. These were identified as such
by screening sera against similar viruses, for example
BCoV or HCoV-OC43 (as an antigenic facsimile for
BCoV). It is possible that other MERS-CoV-like viruses
also reside within DCs, but this does not detract from
the definitive finding of MERS-CoV genetic sequences in
both DCs and humans [117, 142, 143].
Screening studies have shown that juvenile DCs are
more often positive for virus or viral RNA while older
DCs are more likely to be seropositive and RNA or virus
negative [76, 77, 144]. In adult DCs, MERS-CoV RNA has
been detected among animals with pre-existing antibody,
suggesting re-infection is possible [77, 144]. Viral loads
among positive DCs can be very high [4, 76, 77, 139, 144]
and DCs have been found positive both when ill with
URT respiratory signs [77, 117, 142, 145] or when
apparently healthy [137]. These findings indicate DCs host
natural MERS-CoV infections. Furthermore, stored DC
sera have revealed signs of MERS-CoV in DCs which date
back over three decades (the earliest collected in 1983)
[4, 133, 135]. Older sera have not been tested and so
precisely how long DCs have been afflicted by MERS-
CoV, whether the virus is enzootic among them, intro-
duced to them decades or centuries ago from bats in Af-
rica or the Arabian Peninsula, or they are the subject of
regular but short-lived viral incursions from an as yet un-
known host, cannot be answered.
Researchers sought to determine a direction for infec-
tion; were DCs transmitting virus to humans or were
humans infecting DCs? At a Qatari site, a farm owner
and his employee became ill in mid-October 2013 and
tested positive for MERS-CoV RNA in a sputum and
throat swab sample, respectively. RT-rtPCRs found
MERS-CoV RNA in 11 of 14 positive DC nasal swabs at
the farm; six (43 %) positive by two or more assays
[138]. The results indicated a recent outbreak had
occurred in this herd; the first indication of MERS-CoV
RNA found within DCs with a temporal association to
human infections. Three positive DC samples were
confirmed by sequencing a 358 nt portion of the spike
gene; these sequences were identical to each other, again
with close homology to other human and DC MERS-
CoV sequences [138]. The DCs and human contacts
yielded ORF1a and ORF4b sequences differing by only a
single nucleotide each, clustering closely with the Hafr-
Al-Batin_1_2013 variant [138]. Subsequent case studies
found evidence of a concurrent human and DC infection
and the direction of that infection was inferred to be from
the ill DCs and to their human owners [117, 142, 146].
Partial genome sequences indicated that a human and a
MERS-CoV RT-rtPCR positive DC had been infected by a
variant of the same virus, harbouring the same distinct
pattern of nucleotide polymorphisms. [142] All nine DC
in the owner’s herd, serially sampled, reacted in a recom-
binant S1 antigen ELISA, with the two animals that had
been RT-rtPCR positive showing a small, verifiable rise in
antibody titre [142]. A rise in titre theoretically begins 10
to 21 days after DC infection [142]. The authors suggested
that the rise in titre in DC sera which occurred alongside
a declining RNA load, while the patient was actively ill
and hospitalized, indicated that the DCs were infected first
followed by the owner [117, 142]. BCoV antibodies were
also present, and rising in one of the two RT-rtPCR posi-
tive animals but no animal’s antibodies could neutralise
BCoV infection [142].
Camel calving season occurs in the winter months
(between late October and late February; Fig. 3) and this
may be a time when there is increased risk to humans of
spill-over due to new infections among naïve DC popu-
lations [128]. What role maternal camel antibody might
Mackay and Arden Virology Journal  (2015) 12:222 Page 10 of 21
play in delaying infection of calves remains unknown
[128, 142]. Juvenile DCs appear to host active infection
more often than adult DCs and thus the sacrificial
slaughter of DCs, which must be five years of age or older
(termed a thane), may not be accompanied by significant
risk of exposure to infection. In contrast to earlier results,
slaughterhouse workers who kill both younger and older
DCs, may be an occupational group with significantly
higher incidence of seropositivity to MERS-CoV when an-
imals have active MERS-CoV infections [129, 139, 147–
149]. Expanded virological investigations of African DCs
may lead to more seropositive animals and geographic
areas in which humans may be at risk. It is possible that
there are areas where humans already harbour MERS-
CoV infections that have not been identified because of an
absence of laboratory surveillance. Virological investiga-
tions of bats may lead to findings of ancestral viruses and
viral 'missing links' and identifying any other animal
sources of zoonotic spread is important to inform options
for reducing human exposures [56, 76].
Virus survival in the environment
Infectious MERS-CoV added to DC, goat or cow milk and
stored at 4 °C could be recovered at least 72 h later and, if
stored at 22 °C, recovery was possible for up to 48 h [150].
MERS-CoV titre decreased somewhat when recovered
from milk at 22 °C but pasteurization completely ablated
MERS-CoV infectivity [150]. In a subsequent study,
MERS-CoV RNA was identified in the milk, nasal secre-
tion and faeces of DCs from Qatar [151].
A single study has examined the ability of MERS-CoV
to survive in the environment [150]. Plastic or steel
surfaces were inoculated with 106 TCID50 of MERS-CoV
at different temperature and relative humidity (RH) and
virus recovery was attempted in cell culture. At high
ambient temperature (30 °C) and low RH (30 %) MERS-
CoV remained viable for 24 h [150]. By comparison, a
well known and efficently transmitted respiratory virus,
influenza A virus, could not be recovered in culture
beyond four hours under any conditions [150]. Aerosol
experiments found MERS-CoV viability only decreased
7 % at low RH at 20 °C. In comparison, influenza A virus
decreased by 95 % [150]. MERS-CoV survival is inferior
to that previously demonstrated for SARS-CoV [152].
For context, pathogenic bacteria can remain viable and
airborne for 45 min in a coughed aerosol and can spread
4 m. MERS-CoV’s ability to remain viable over long time
periods gives it the capacity to thoroughly contaminate a
room’s surfaces when occupied by an infected and symp-
tomatic patient [153]. Whether MERS-CoV can remain
adrift and infectious for extended periods (truly airborne)
remains unknown. Such findings expand our understand-
ing of the possibilities for droplets to transmit respiratory
viruses in many settings, including hospital waiting rooms,
emergency departments, treatment rooms, open intensive
care facilities and private patient rooms. The nature and
quality of air exchange, circulation and filtration are im-
portant variables in risk measurement and reduction as is
the use of negative pressure rooms to contain known
cases. Droplet spread between humans is considered the
mechanism of human-to-human transmission and the
need for droplet precautions was emphasized after the Al-
Ahsa hospital, the KSA and the South Korean outbreaks
[21, 23, 154, 155]. By extrapolation, aerosol-generating
events involving DCs (urination, defecation, and prepar-
ation and consumption of DC products) should be fac-
tored into risk measurement and reduction efforts and
messaged using appropriate context. The provision of evi-
dence supporting the best formulation of personal pro-
tective equipment to be worn by HCWs who receive,
manage or conduct procedures on infectious cases
remains a priority.
Transmission of MERS-CoV among humans
MERS-CoV was found and characterized because of its
apparent association with severe, and therefore more
obvious, illness in humans; we were the canaries in the
coal mine. Sero-assays and prospective cohort studies
have yet to determine the extent to which milder or
asymptomatic cases contribute to MERS-CoV transmis-
sion chains. However, transmission of MERS-CoV is de-
fined as sporadic (not sustained), intra-familial, often
healthcare associated, inefficient and requiring close and
prolonged contact [22, 31, 63, 93, 97, 102, 156] In a
household study, 14 of 280 (5 %) contacts of 26 MERS-
CoV positive index patients were RNA or antibody posi-
tive; the rate of general transmission, even in outbreaks
is around 3 % [31]. It seems that the majority of human
cases of MERS-CoV, even when numbers appear to in-
crease suddenly, do not readily transmit to more than
one other human so to date, the localized epidemic of
MERS-CoV has not been self-sustaining [157–161]. That
is to say, the basic reproduction number (R0) - the aver-
age number of infections caused by one infected
individual in a fully susceptible population – has been
close to one throughout various clusters and outbreaks.
If R0 was greater than 1, a sustained increase in case
numbers would be expected. Some Ro calculations may
be affected by incomplete case contact tracing, limited
community testing and how a case is defined. That
MERS has had a constant presence in the Arabian Pen-
insula since 2012 is due to ongoing, sporadic spill-over
events from DCs amplified by poorly controlled hospital
outbreaks.
The first known MERS human-to-human transmission
event was one characterized by acute LRT disease in a
healthcare setting in Jordan. In stark contrast, a sero-
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survey of HCW who were sometimes in close and pro-
longed contact with the first, fatal MERS-CoV case in
2012 [162], found none of the HCW had seroconverted
four months later, despite an absence of eye protection
and variable compliance with required PPE standards
[162].
Early on in the MERS story, samples for testing were
mostly collected from patients with severe illness and
not those with milder acute respiratory tract infections.
Contacts of confirmed MERS cases were often observed
for clinical illness, but not tested. These omissions may
have confounded our understanding of MERS-CoV
transmission and biased early data towards higher num-
bers of seriously ill and hospitalized patients, inflating
the apparent proportion of fatal cases. Case–control
studies were not a focus. As testing paradigms changed
and contacts were increasingly tested, more asymptom-
atic and mild infections were recognized [163].
A rise in the cases termed asymptomatic (which
enlarge the denominator for calculations of the propor-
tion of fatal cases, defined in [164]) resulted in a drop in
the proportion of fatal cases during the Jeddah-2014
outbreak. Historically, such rises are consistent with
changing definitions and laboratory responses and clin-
ical management of a newly discovered virus infection
that was first noted only among the severely ill. Upon
follow-up, over three-quarters of such MERS-CoV RNA
positive people did recall having one or more symptoms
at the time, despite being reported as asymptomatic
[165] raising some question over the reliability of other
reported data.
The proportion of fatal MERS cases within the KSA
compared to outside the KSA, as well as the age, and
sex distribution change in different ways when compar-
ing MERS outbreaks. Approximately 43 % of MERS
cases (549 of 1277) in the KSA were fatal betwen 2012
and December 2015 while 21 % (72 of 330) died among
those occurring outside of the KSA. The total number of
male cases always outnumber females and the propor-
tion of male deaths is always greater than the proportion
of females who die. However the proportion of male
deaths from total males with MERS is a similar figure to
that for females. In the KSA, there is a greater propor-
tion of younger males among cases and deaths than were
observed from the 2015 South Korean or the Jeddah-
2014 outbreaks (Additional file 2: Figure S2). Why these
aspects have differed may be due to differences in the
time to presentation and diagnosis, the nature and qual-
ity of supportive care, the way a person became infected
(habits, exposure to a human or zoonotic source, viral
load, route of infection) or the extent to which different
populations are burdened by underlying diseases [40].
As a group, HCWs comprised 16 % of MERS cases in
the KSA and South Korea. It is apparent that the weekly
proportion of infected HCWs increases alongside each
steep rise in overall detections (Fig. 5). In May 2013, the
WHO published guidelines for IPC during care of prob-
able or confirmed cases of MERS-CoV infection in a
healthcare setting [166]. This is explainable because to
date, each case rise has been intimately associated with
healthcare-facility related outbreaks [118]. These rises in
MERS-CoV detections can decrease the average age dur-
ing each event because HCWs are usually younger than
inpatients with MERS. Healthcare facilities have been a
regular target for suggested improvements aimed at im-
proving infection prevention and control (IPC) procedures
[115, 118].
Molecular epidemiology: using genomes to understand
outbreaks
Most of the analysis of MERS-CoV genetics has been
performed using high throughput or “deep” sequencing
methods for complete genome deduction [167–169].
MERS-CoV was the first subject of such widespread use
of deep sequencing to study an emerging viral outbreak
with global reach. The technique can produce genomic
Fig. 5 Data on MERS-CoV detections among HCWs based on publicly described laboratory confirmed cases collated into the author’s curated
line list as at 4th September 2015. Sources of these public data include the WHO, Ministries of Health and FluTrackers [207–209]. Earlier and
subsequent versions of this chart are maintained on a personal blog [210]
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length coverage in a single experiment with highly
repetitious measurement of each nucleotide position
[52, 140]. Despite assays having been published early
on, subgenomic sequencing, once the mainstay of viral
outbreak studies, has less often been published during
MERS-CoV characterization [48]. As more genomes from
both humans and DCs have been characterized, two
clades have become apparent; A and B (Fig. 6). Clade A
contains only human-derived MERS-CoV genomes from
Jordan, while Clade B comprises the majority of human
and camel genomes deduced thus far [168].
Two studies during 2015, one looking at Jeddah-2014
MERS-CoV variants and another looking at a variant
exported from South Korea to China, have now identi-
fied signs of genetic recombination among MERS-CoV
variants. While human and camel whole genome se-
quences have retained >99 % identity with each other,
members of genetically distinct lineages can and do swap
genetic material when suitable conditions and coinfec-
tions co-occur [170–172]. Shared identity implies that
the major source for human acquisition is the DC, ra-
ther than another animal, although more testing of other
animal species is needed to confirm that conclusion.
Over a month, a DC virus sequenced on different occa-
sions did not change at all indicating a degree of gen-
omic stability in its host, supporting that DCs are the
natural, rather than intermediate, host for the MERS-CoV
we know today [77]. To date, recombination has been
localised to breakpoints near the boundary between
ORF1a and ORF1b regions, within the spike gene [170]
and in the ORF1b region (Fig. 2) [172]. It is not unex-
pected that recombination should occur since it is well
known among other CoVs [124] and because the majority
of MERS-CoV whole genomes collected from samples
spanning three years (2012–2015) and from humans,
camels and different countries have shown close genetic
identity to each other, with just enough subtle variation to
support outbreak investigations so long as whole genome
sequencing is applied [52, 77, 135, 138, 168, 173–175].
Changes in genome sequence may herald alterations
to virus transmissibility, replication, persistence, lethal-
ity or response to future drugs. If we have prior know-
ledge of the impact of genetic changes because of
thorough characterization studies, we can closely
Fig. 6 The genetic relationship between MERS-CoV nucleotide
sequences (downloaded from GenBank using the listed accession
numbers and from virological.org [212]). This neighbour joining tree
was created in MEGA v6 using an alignment of human and DC-
derived MERS-CoV sequences (Geneious v8.1 [211]). Clades are
indicated next to dark (Clade A) or pale (Clade B) blue vertical bars.
Camel icons denote genomes from DCs. Healthcare or community
outbreaks are boxed and labelled using previously described
schemes [212, 213]
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monitor the genomic regions and better understand
any changes in transmission or disease patterns as they
occur. Genetic mutations noted during the largest of hu-
man outbreaks, Jeddah-2014, did not impart any major
replicative or immunomodulatory changes when com-
pared to earlier viral variants in vitro [156, 176]. However,
we understand very little of the phenotypic outcomes that
result from subtle genetic change in MERS-CoV genomes.
To date no clinical relevance or obvious in vivo changes
to viral replication, shedding or transmission has been re-
ported or attributed to mutations or to new recombinant
viruses [156]. But vigilance and larger, more contemporary
and in vivo studies are needed.
Genome sequence located to a distinct clade were
identified from an Egyptian DC that was probably
imported from Sudan. This does not fit into either of the
current clades [125, 168, 177]. A virus sequenced from a
Neoromicia capensis bat was more closely related to
MERS-CoV than other large bat-derived sequences had
been to that point, but the genome of a variant of a
MERS-CoV has yet to be discovered and deduced from
any bat [125].
Analyses of MERS-CoV genomes have shown that
most single nucleotide differences among variants were
located in the last third of the genome (Fig. 2), which
encodes the spike protein and accessory proteins [168].
At least nine MERS-CoV genomes contained amino acid
substitutions in the receptor binding domain (RBD) of
the spike protein and codons 158 (N-terminal region),
460 (RBD), 1020 (in heptad repeat 1), 1202 and 1208 bear
investigation as markers of adaptive change [140, 169]. The
spike protein had not changed in the recombinant MERS-
CoV genome identified in China in 2015 but was reported
to have varied at a higher rate than that for complete
MERS-CoV genomes, among South Korean variants
[172, 178]. This highlights that subgenomic regions
may not always contain enough genetic diversity to
prove useful for differentiating viral variants. Despite
this, one assay amplifying a 615 nucleotide fragment of
the spike S2 domain gene for Sanger sequencing agreed
with the results generated by the sequencing of a some
full genomes and was useful to define additional se-
quence groupings [177].
Genomic sequence can also be used to define the geo-
graphic boundaries of a cluster or outbreak and monitor
its progress, based on the similarity of the variants found
among infected humans and animals when occurring
together, or between different sites and times (Fig. 6)
[169]. This approach was employed when defining the
geographically constrained MERS hospital outbreak in
Al-Ahsa, which occurred between 1st April and 23rd
May 2013, as well as clusters in Buraidah and a commu-
nity outbreak in Hafr Al-Batin, the KSA. Genomic
sequencing identified that approximately 12 MERS-CoV
detections from a community outbreak in Hafr Al-Batin
between June and August 2013 may have been triggered
by an index case becoming infected through DC contact
[175]. Sequencing MERS-CoV genomes from the 2013
Al-Ahsa hospital outbreak indicated that multiple viral
variants contributed to the cases but that most were simi-
lar enough to each other to be consistent with human-to-
human transmission. Molecular epidemiology has re-
vealed otherwise hidden links in transmission chains
encompassing a period of up to five months [179]. How-
ever, most outbreaks have not continued for longer than
two to three months and so opportunities for the virus to
adapt further to humans through co-infection and sus-
tained serial passage have been rare [169]. In Riyadh-2014,
genetic evidence supported the likelihood of multiple
external introductions of virus, implicating a range of
healthcare facilities in an event that otherwise looked
contiguous [23, 168, 179]. Riyadh is a nexus for camel and
human travel and has had more MERS cases than any
other region of the KSA to date but also harbours a wide
range of MERS-CoV variants [128, 167, 179]. However the
South Korean outbreak originated from a single infected
person, resulting in three to four generations of cases [180,
181]. Studies of this apparently recombinant viral variant
did not find an increased evolutionary rate and no sign of
virus adaptation thus the outbreak seems to have been
driven by circumstance rather than circumstance together
with mutation [181].
Contact tracing and the possible importance of
asymptomatic cases
For many MERS cases detected outside the Arabian
Peninsula, extensive contact tracing has been performed
and the results described in detail. Contact tracing is es-
sential to contain the emergence and transmission of a
new virus and today it is supported by molecular epi-
demiology. Although it is an expensive and time con-
suming process, contact tracing can identify potential
new infections and through active or passive monitoring,
react more rapidly if disease does develop. Results of
contact tracing to date have found that onward trans-
mission among humans is an infrequent event. For ex-
ample, there were 83 contacts, both symptomatic and
asymptomatic, of a case treated in Germany who trav-
elled from the UAE but no sign of virus or antibody
were found in any of them [73]. The very first MERS
case had made contact with 56 HCWs and 48 others,
but none developed any indication of infection [162]. In
a study of 123 contacts of a case treated in France, only
seven matched the definition for a possible case and
were tested; one who had shared a 20 m2 hospital room
while in a bed 1.5 m away from the index case for a pro-
longed period was positive [26]. None of the contacts of
the first two MERS cases imported into the USA in 2014
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contained any MERS-CoV footprint [182] and none of
the 131 contacts of two travellers returning to the
Netherlands developed MERS-CoV antibodies or tested
RNA positive [25, 183]. Analyses of public data reveal
many likely instances of nosocomial acquisition of infec-
tion in the Arabian Peninsula and these data may be ac-
companied by some details noting contact with a known
case or facility. One example identified the likely role of
a patient with a subclinical infection, present in a hos-
pital during their admission for other reasons, as the
likeliest index case triggering a family cluster [93]. Con-
tact tracing was a significant factor in the termination of
a 2015 outbreak involving multiple South Korean hospi-
tals [184]. Such studies demonstrate the necessity of
finding and understanding a role for mild and asymp-
tomatic cases, together with restricting close contact or
prolonged exposure of infected people to others, espe-
cially older family members and friends with underlying
disease (Fig. 4c).
Hospital associated MERS outbreaks
The hospital-associated outbreak in Jeddah in 2014 was
the largest and most rapid accumulation of MERS-CoV
detections to date. The greatest number of MERS-CoV
detections of any month on record occurred in Jeddah
in April. The outbreak was mostly (>60 % of cases)
associated with human-to-human spread within hospital
environments and resulted from a lack of, or breakdown
in, infection prevention and control [37, 185, 186]. A rise
in fatalities followed the rapid increase in case numbers.
In 2015 two large outbreaks occurred. South Korea
was the site of the first large scale outbreak outside the
Arabian Peninsula and produced the first cases in both
South Korea and China, occurring between May and July
2015. This was closely followed by a distinct outbreak in
Ar Riyad province in the KSA which appeared to come
under control in early November.
After staying in Bahrain for two weeks, a 68 year old
male (68 M) travelled home to South Korea via Qatar,
arriving free of symptoms on the 4th May 2015 [187]. He
developed fever, myalgia and a cough nearly a week later
(11th). He visited a clinic as an outpatient between the
12th and 15th of May and was admitted to Hospital A on
the 15th [188]. He was discharged from Hospital A on
the 17th then visited and was admitted to the emergency
department of Hospital B on the 18th. During this sec-
ond stay, a sputum sample was taken and tested positive
for MERS-CoV on the 20th [187, 188], triggering transfer
to the designated isolation treatment facility. Over a
period of 10 days, the index case was seen at three dif-
ferent hospitals, demonstrating a key feature of “hospital
shopping” that shaped the South Korean outbreak.
Approximately 34 people were infected during this time
[187]. In total 186 cases were generated in this outbreak,
all linked through a single transmission chain to 68 M;
37 cases died [189]. In South Korea, the national health
insurance system provides for relatively low cost med-
ical care, defraying some costs by making family mem-
bers responsible for a portion of the ministration of the
sick, resulting in them sometimes staying for long pe-
riods in the rooms that often have more than four beds
in them [24]. Other factors thought to have enabled
this outbreak included unfamiliarity of local clinicians
with MERS, ease with which the public can visit and be
treated by tertiary hospitals, the custom of visiting sick
friends and relatives in hospitals, the hierarchical na-
ture of Korean society, crowded emergency rooms,
poor IPC measures, a lack of negative pressure isola-
tion rooms and poor inter-hospital communication of
patient disease histories [24, 190–192]. All of the re-
ported transmission occurred across three or four gen-
erations and apart from one unknown source, were all
hospital-acquired [24, 120, 181, 193–195]. Few clinical
details about these cases have been reported to date
and detail on transmission and contact tracing is min-
imal. The hospitals involved were initially not identi-
fied, governmental guidance and actions produced
confusing messages and there was very limited com-
munication at all early on which resulted in unneces-
sary concern, distrust and a distinct economic impact
[191, 196–198]. Early in the outbreak, a infected travel-
ler, the son of an identified case in South Korea, passed
through Hong Kong on his way to China where he was
located, isolated and cared for in China [91, 199, 200].
No contacts became ill. The outbreak was brought
under control in late July/ early August [201] after
improved IPC measures were employed, strong contact
tracing monitoring and quarantine, expanded labora-
tory testing, hospitals were better secured, specialized
personnel were dispatched to manage cases and inter-
national cooperation increased [202, 203]. A review of
public data showed that, as for MERS in the KSA, older
age and the presence of underlying disease were sig-
nificantly associated with a fatal outcome in South
Korea. [40] Even though R0 is <1, super-spreading
events facilitated by circumstances created in health-
care settings and characterized by cluster sizes over
150, such as this one, are not unexpected from MERS-
CoV infection [204]. The dynamic of an outbreak de-
pends on the R0 and an individual’s viral shedding
patterns, contact type and frequency, hospital proce-
dures and population structure and density [204].
In the region of Ar Riyad, including the capital city of
Riyadh, a hospital based cluster began, within a single
hospital, from late June 2015 [205]. By mid-September
there had been approximately170 cases reported but the
outbreak appeared to been brought under control in
November.
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Conclusions
It became apparent early on that MERS-CoV spread
relatively ineffectively from human-to-human. Despite
ongoing and possibly seasonal introduction of virus to
the human population via infected DCs and perhaps
other animals yet to be identified, the vast majority of
MERS-CoV transmission has occurred from infected to
uninfected humans in close and prolonged contact
through circumstances created by poor infection control
in health care settings. This opportunistic virus has had
its greatest impact on those with underlying diseases
and such vulnerable people, sometimes suffering mul-
tiple comorbidities, have been most often associated
with hospitals, creating a perfect storm of exposure,
transmission and mortality. It remains unclear if this
group are uniquely affected by MERS-CoV or if other
respiratory virus infections, including those from
HCoVs, produce a similarly serious impact. In South
Korea, a single imported case created an outbreak of 185
cases and 36 deaths that had a disproportionate impact
on economic performance, community behaviour and
trust in government and the health care system. House-
hold human-to human transmission occurs but is also
limited. Educational programs will be essential tools for
combatting the spread of MERS-CoV both within urban
and regional communities and for the health care
setting.
Vigilance remains important for containment since
MERS-CoV is a virus with a genetic makeup that has
been observed for only three years and is not stable.
Among all humans reported to be infected, nearly 40 %
have died. Continued laboratory testing, sequencing,
analysis, timely data sharing and clear communication
are essential for such vigilance to be effective. Global
alignment of case definitions would further aid accurate
calculation of a case fatality ratio by including subclinical
case numbers. Whole genome sequencing has been used
extensively to study MERS-CoV travel and variation and
although it remains a tool for experts, it appears to be
the best tool for the job.
MERS and SARS have some clinical similarities but they
also diverge significantly [206]. Defining characteristics in-
clude the higher PFC among MERS cases (above 50 % in
2013 and currently at 30-40 %; well above the 9 % of
SARS) and the higher association between fatal MERS
and older males with underlying comorbidities. For the vi-
ruses, MERS-CoV has a broader tropism, grows more rap-
idly in vitro, more rapidly induces cytopathogenic change,
triggers distinct transcriptional responses, makes use of a
different receptor, induces a more proinflammatory state
and has a delayed innate antiviral response compared to
SARS-CoV.
There appears to be a 2-3 % prevalence of MERS-CoV
in the KSA with a 5 % chance of secondary transmission
within the household. There is an increased risk of infec-
tion through certain occupations at certain times and a
much greater chance for spread to other humans during
circumstances created by humans, which drives more ef-
fective transmission than any R0would predict on face
value. Nonetheless, despite multiple mass gatherings that
have afforded the virus many millions of opportunities
to spread, there have remarkably been no reported out-
breaks of MERS or MERS-CoV during or immediately
after these events. There is no evidence that MERS-CoV
is a virus of pandemic concern. Nonetheless, hospital
settings continue to describe MERS cases and outbreaks
in the Arabian Peninsula. As long as we facilitate the
spread of MERS-CoV among our most vulnerable popu-
lations, the world must remain on alert for cases which
may be exported more frequently when a host country
with infected camel reservoirs is experiencing human
clusters or outbreaks.
The MERS-CoV appears to be an enzootic virus
infecting the DC URT with evidence of recent genetic
recombination. It may once have had its origins among
bats, but evidence is lacking and the relevance of that to
today’s ongoing epidemic is academic. Thanks to quick
action, the sensitive and rapid molecular diagnostic tools
required to achieve rapid and sensitive detection goal
have been in place and made widely available since the
virus was reported in 2012. RT-PCR testing of LRT sam-
ples remains the gold standard for MERS-CoV confirm-
ation. Serological tools continue to emerge but they are
in need of further validation using samples from mild
and asymptomatic infections and a densely sampled co-
hort study to follow contacts of new cases may address
this need. Similarly, the important question of whether
those who do shed MERS-CoV RNA for extended pe-
riods are infectious while appearing well, continues to
go unanswered. It is even unclear just how many
‘asymptomatic’ infections have been described and re-
ported correctly which in turn raises questions about the
reliability of other clinical data collection to date. While
the basic virology of MERS-CoV has advanced over the
course of the past three years, understanding what is
happening in, and the interplay between, camel, environ-
ment and human is still in its infancy.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Figure S1. The 26 countries in which MERS-CoV has
been identified and a guide as to the number of cases at each location.
Local transmission in 13 countries is highlighted (blue star) as are countries
with DCs that contain antibodies reactive with MERS-CoV, viral RNA or
infectious virus (camel icon). Correct as of the 29thAugust, 2015. Adapted
and reprinted from Mackay IM, Arden KE. Middle East respiratory syndrome:
An emerging coronavirus infection tracked by the crowd. Virus Res 2015 Vol
202:60–88 with permission from Elsevier [5]. (EPS 41077 kb)
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Additional file 2: Figure S2. MERS-CoV detections, age and sex
pyramids. A) All MERS-CoV detections worldwide and B) those with fatal
outcomes; C) The distribution of detections limited to the KSA cases only
and D) those with a fatal outcome; E) The distribution resulting from the
Jeddah-2014 outbreak, arbitrarily defined as spanning from the week
beginning 17th March 2014 and ending in the week beginning 7th July
2014 and F) those with a fatal outcome; G) the distribution resulting from
the South Korean-2015 outbreak and H) those with a fatal outcome; I)
the distribution during the Riyadh-2015 outbreak and J) those with a fatal
outcome; data are based on laboratory confirmed cases collated into the
author’s curated line list as at 4th September 2015. Note the changed x-axis
scale between A-D and E-J. Sources of these public data include the WHO,
Ministries of Health and FluTrackers [206–208]. Earlier and subsequent ver-
sions of this chart are maintained on a personal blog [209]. (EPS 6702 kb)
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